Pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) engage in exclusionary practices favoring their own captive mail order pharmacies. They justify this practice by pointing to mail order's price superiority to retail pharmacy outlets. We will present evidence from two sources indicating that the second largest independent PBM, Medco Health Solutions, has been pricing brand drugs dispensed from its mail order pharmacy at, or near, acquisition costs. While these prices are significantly below retail levels, they cannot be said to be competitive until the possibility of recoupment elsewhere is investigated.
Introduction
Outpatient prescription drugs have become the fastest rising component of health care costs.
Specialists in managing drug benefits called pharmacy benefits managers (PBMs) have become the main line of defense against rising drug costs. PBMs use a variety of techniques to contain costs. These techniques are generally grouped into the following categories: (1) retail network management, (2) mail order pharmacy, (3) formulary and rebate management, (4) claims processing, and (5) drug utilization review. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate exclusionary practices that PBMs employ in managing mail order pharmacies.
Retail network management consists of negotiating discounts with retail pharmacies in exchange for being designated as a preferred provider and eligible for reimbursement. The inclination of PBMs is to favor expansive networks at higher average reimbursement costs as opposed to smaller networks with lower average costs. The national retail network of large independent PBMs contain over 55,000 pharmacies, or more than 90% of all chain and community pharmacies in the United States.
The opposite is the case with mail order pharmacies. Mail order pharmacy networks are limited to a single source of supply --PBMs own internal mail order operations. PBMs will refuse reimbursement if a prescription is filled by any other mail order pharmacy. But, PBMs do not stop at sole sourcing when it comes to favoring their own captive mail order operations. They have also created a variety of techniques to steer prescriptions away from retail pharmacies. This includes mandatory mail order for maintenance drugs used to treat chronic illnesses like high cholesterol and arthritis. It includes limiting 90-day prescriptions to mail order. It may even include not squeezing the highest discounts from retail pharmacies in order to enhance the price competitiveness of their own mail order operations.
These practices are exclusionary, "self-dealing" and represent a potential conflict of interest. But, the courts have made it clear that such practices are not per se a violation of antitrust laws.
Because the "rule of reason" applies, exclusionary practices must be evaluated on the basis of both benefits and costs. PBMs argue that practices favoring their own captive operations produce substantial savings that are passed on to consumers. They argue that considerable economies of scale and integration efficiencies can be obtained if mail order is limited to a single captive source. PBMs point to a number of credible studies conducted by such independent organizations as the General Accounting Office (GAO), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) that show that brand drug prescriptions filled by captive mail order pharmacies are priced an average of 9% to 10% less than the same prescriptions filled by retail outlets. 1 2 3 But, the price savings of mail order might not be due to operational efficiencies. They may be due to a deceptive strategy of pricing mail order low while recouping margin deficiencies through secretive rebate retention. Based on two sets of data, we will demonstrate that Medco Health Solutions, the second largest independent PBM, has been pricing it mail order operations at, or near, costs of sale. This aggressive pricing of mail order is part of an overall strategy to divert demand away from retail to captive mail order.
We present the case that captive mail order is a key contributing factor in PBMs' ability to secure rebates from brand name drug manufacturers. By recasting Medco's margins by revenue "driver" rather than by revenue source, we demonstrate that mail order gross profit margins are in the competitive range of 7% --neither too high nor too low. PBMs are currently under pressure to move toward a more transparent business model in which the prices of individual services are proportional to costs and rebates are completely passed through to clients. We conclude the paper with some observations about the effect that the trend toward transparency might have on the mail order pharmacy market.
Concentration in the Mail Order Pharmacy Market
Mail order pharmacies can be segmented by corporate structure-captive mail order pharmacies, (CMOPs) owned by PBMs and independent mail order pharmacies (IMOPs). In turn, PBMs can also be segmented by corporate structure -independent companies and captive operations within other companies. Today, the industry is dominated by three large independent PBMs {hereafter the "Big 3") -Caremark Rx, Medco Health Solutions, and Express Scripts. According to a Kaiser Foundation report, approximately two-thirds of all prescriptions are managed by a PBM. 4 Fifty percent of that market is controlled by the Big 3 PBMs. 5 The clinics with on-site and mail order pharmacy programs designed to take advantage of 340B drug discounts. 8 The explanation of why IMOPs are relegated to this niche market is a corollary to our theory of the true value of CMOPs to PBMs. Much of the growth of mail order relative to retail can be traced to the growth rates of drugs for chronic illness. This is because drugs for chronic illnesses such as high cholesterol and arthritis allow for delayed and distanced fulfillment whereas drugs for acute illnesses such as infections require fulfillment immediately. However, some of the growth of mail order relative to retail should be attributed to the exclusionary practices of PBMs that include predatory mail order pricing, mandatory mail order, and mail order only 90-day prescriptions.
The Organization and Technology of CMOPs
The purpose of this section is to take a closer look at the organization and technology of CMOPs with special attention to disclosures by Medco Health Solutions of its CMOP structure. In the next several sections, we will present the case that true value of CMOPs does not stem from dispensing and procurement efficiencies achieved through economies of scale. It stems from the ability of call centers to make cost-saving retrospective therapeutic interchange and the power that ability confers on PBMs when they negotiate rebates with brand name drug manufacturers.
A CMOP is organized into four functional units: (1) large automated dispensing pharmacies; (2) regional specialty pharmacies that supply biotech drugs requiring refrigeration and disposable needles or other infusion technology; (3) regional mail order processing centers and (4) regional call centers. Call centers can further be segmented into two functions: (a) receiving inquiries from patients about medications; (b) making calls out to physicians to persuade them to change prescriptions in order to comply with the formulary design of plan sponsors.
Exhibit 3 is a listing taken from a recent Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 10-K Report
by Medco disclosing CMOP-related properties it leases or owns. 10 It gives some favor to Medco's CMOP structure: 
Rx Processed Per Week
Medco' s Order Processing Center 117,000
North Versailles, PA.
Source:
Pittsburg Tribune-Review, October 16, 2003 The following quote from Medco describes how its call centers function both as patient inquiry incall operations and as out-call operations trying to persuade physicians to change prescriptions.
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Call Center Pharmacies . We operate five call center pharmacies, each of which is licensed as a pharmacy in the state in which it is located and is staffed by service representatives and pharmacists. Personnel at our call center pharmacies are available to answer questions and provide information and support to members 24 hours a day, seven days a week, for members using either our mail order service or our retail pharmacy network. Our call center pharmacies also provide information and services to physicians and pharmacists who service our clients' members. Service representatives and pharmacists at our call center pharmacies use advanced imaging technology and other Internet capabilities to access prescription and health information when providing service to members and assist physicians in reducing costs through dose optimization, generic substitution and the interchange from non-formulary compliant drugs to clinically equivalent formulary compliant drugs.
We will present data later from a recent FTC study that indicates that PBMs rarely make changes to prescriptions while an order is being processed. One of the functions of call centers is to change physicians' decisions when prescriptions are renewed for drugs treating chronic illnesses such as high cholesterol or arthritis. They are not designed to change pending orders of current prescriptions whether they are for drugs treating chronic illnesses or drug treating acute illnesses like infections.
The core technology that gives CMOPs their "captiveness" is not automated dispensing equipment or state-of-the-art Internet order processing websites. It the information technology that give call center employees complete history of patients prescriptions and database technology that relates dispensing histories of plan members by prescribing physician. It is information technology that gives call center personnel on-line access to direct phone numbers and email addresses of physicians. It is information retrieval technology with the capability of emailing physicians soft-copies of pharmacoeconomic studies supporting any proposed therapeutic interchange.
The Source of CMOPs' Price Advantage
The Big 3 independent PBMs have touted their CMOPs as a lower price alternative to retail pharmacies. They generally attribute this price competitiveness to three sources: (1) dispensing efficiencies, (2) volume purchasing discounts, and (3) greater formulary compliance. For example, the following are statements by Express Scripts, Inc and Medco Health Solutions explaining why they can offer such competitive pricing for mail order prescriptions: 13 14 These pharmacies provide members with convenient access to maintenance medications and enable our clients and us to manage drug costs through operating efficiencies and economies of scale. In addition, through our mail service pharmacies we are directly involved with the proscriber and member, and are generally able to achieve a higher level of generic substitutions and therapeutic interventions than can be achieved through the retail pharmacy networks.
Express Scripts, Form 10-K ending December 31, 2002
Our clients benefit in the form of lower drug costs as a result of operating efficiencies yielded by our significant level of automation technology, the value from our scale in purchasing drugs at competitive discounts, and our ability to offer up to a 90-day supply of drugs as compared to a 30-day supply for most retail programs.
Medco Health Solutions, Form 10-K for the Year Ending December 25, 2004 In this section, we take a critical look at the source of captive mail order price superiority. Using two data sets, we demonstrate that Medco Health Solutions, the second largest independent PBM, has been pricing its CMOP at, or near, cost of sale. This means that mail order price superiority to retail is not due so much to lower costs, but due to an acceptance of lower gross profit margins.
The most often cited study of the relative cost-savings provided by CMOPs is a study conducted by the General Accounting Office (GAO) in 2001 of contracts to manage the mail order portion of the Federal Employees Health Benefits Plan (FEHBP). 15 The PBM trade association has cited this GAO study as representative of the benefits that can be delivered by CMOPs. The way the government handled the contract was somewhat unique in that it split the bidding into two parts.
Advance PCS (now merged into Caremark Rx) won the contract to manage the retail network including managing all rebates derived from retail transactions. Medco won the mail order contract including managing all rebates derived from such transactions. Exhibit 5 summarizes the results of that study. The key finding was that Medco mail order pharmacy prices averaged $.78 / Rx lower than retail for generics and $ 8.41/ Rx lower for brand name drugs. In percentage terms, the prices of generic and brand name drug prescriptions were 5.3% and 9.5% lower, respectively.
In the case of generic drug prescriptions, dispensing efficiencies alone can explain mail order price superiority. There is no question that mail order facilities, packed with machinery, are more efficient that retail pharmacies at dispensing prescriptions. But that advantage is not unique to CMOPs. The same efficiencies can be found in IMOP facilities owned by government agencies like the Veterans Administration (VA). An Arthur Anderson study has estimated that the labor cost of dispensing a prescription by a retail pharmacy to be $4.27. 16 The VA has estimated that the dispensing cost per prescription at it automated mail order facilities was approximately $2 in fiscal 2000. 17 When approximately $1.00 in postage per prescription is added, then the costsaving achieved by filling a prescription by mail order runs about $1.27 per prescription, more than the $.78 / Rx price difference found for generics in the GAO study. In the case of brand name drug prescriptions, dispensing efficiencies can only explain only about 15% of the $8.41 channel price differential. Can purchase volume discounts explain the rest?
Purchasing volume is an extremely important source of bargaining power for pharmacies -retail or mail order --when they negotiate generic prices with suppliers. There are often five or more manufacturers producing any given generic drug. The pharmacy has total discretion as to what manufacturer's product it wants to use. The discounts come in the form of charge-back credits posted by the distributor to the buyer's receivable account and offset by debits to the manufacturers' payable account. Exhibit 6 below indicates that large chain drugstores procure two to four times the volume of drugs as CMOPs. It is doubtful that any CMOP receives higher generic discounts than a Walgreen or a CVS. In the case of brand name drugs, pharmaceutical manufacturers channel all discounts to PBM operations rather than pharmacy operations because it is PBMs who have discretionary authority over demand. Despite their size, the retail pharmacy operations of Walgreen and CVS receive no rebates from brand name drug manufacturers. The same is true for their mail order pharmacies.
On the other hand, the PBM operations of chain drugstores receive rebates. The same is true with Big 3 independents PBMs like Medco. Brand name drug companies enter into contracts with the PBM side, not the mail order side, of the business because it is the PBM operation that has discretionary authority over demand.
The GAO reported that PBMs negotiated discounts with retail pharmacies that left them an average of 8% mark-up over wholesale acquisition costs for brand name drug ingredients. 18 Based on the expectation that Medco paid about the same as large retailers for brand drugs, the additional 9.5% discount Medco gave to the FEHBP for mail order prescriptions means that
Medco was selling brand ingredients at or below cost. They may have been making a decent margin on the dispensing component of mail order prescriptions, but the overall mail order margin had to be at or near zero.
There is antidotal evidence that support our analysis of the FEHBP contract. Quoting from a U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray research paper on the PBM industry in 2001: 19 The first contract that raised concerns was the mail-order component of the Federal Employees Program (FEP) -a 2.5 million-member contract with roughly $1 billion in annual drug-spend that Medco was awarded earlier this year. Although all the major industry participants were bidding on this contract, Medco won the contract (which it has managed since 1986) after a series of last-minute negotiations, in which Medco appears to have lowered the cost of the contract to the government and made other price/cost concessions….Although Medco has a reputation for being the low-cost provider (especially in mail order), most member of the channel (i.e. consultants, benefit managers) believe that Medco priced the FEP contract very near or below profitability levels in order to retain the business.
As "driven" by discretionary, retrospective therapeutic interchange and are a function of transactions flowing through both the retail and mail order channel. This is the rationale behind reallocating rebates to retail and mail order lines in financial statements.
The True Value of CMOPs
It is rare in the health care industry for payers to own providers. CMOPs represent that rare corporate structure where a health care payer, PBMs, own a health care provider. Why, then, do the Big 3 PBMs and large insurance companies such as Aetna, CIGNA, and Wellpoint find it economic to have CMOPs? There must be some special economic advantages provided by
CMOPs that goes beyond dispensing efficiencies.
In this section, we present the case that the true value of CMOPs stems from a special ability to facilitate changes in prescriptions from one drug to another. Specifically, we will present the case CMOPs have special value because they facilitate retrospective therapeutic interchange (TI), as opposed to concurrent switches -either generic substitution or TI. CMOPs also have value in enhancing PBMs ability to negotiate rebates. We have discussed in detail elsewhere our contention that rebates are received as much for agreeing not to make switches as making switches. 22 Thus, CMOPs aid in controlling drug cost both through switching of generics for brands and through enhancing PBMs ability to extract rebates from brand name drug manufacturers.
The fact that both independent PBMs and captives of insurance companies find CMOPs economic suggests that the value created by CMOPs transcends the corporate structure of
PBMs. There is something about the corporate structure of CMOPs -their "captiveness" --that is the key to their value. While CMOPs might occasionally make it easier for PBMs to engage in cost increasing switches, or make it easier for PBMs to ignore cost decreasing switches, that 
CMOPs and Generic Substitution
CMOPs have no special role or value in promoting generic substitution -a concurrent switch of a generic for its higher cost off-patent brand. The generic substitution rate is the ratio of the number of generic drug prescriptions dispensed divided by the sum of generic and off-patent brand prescriptions that are bio-equivalents. Usually, state laws permit pharmacists to make such a switch with out prior physician approval because they are near perfect substitutes. In addition, with minimum acceptable cost (MAC) pricing, pharmacies have great incentives to take the lead in generic substitution because they will only be reimbursed at the generic price even if they dispense a more costly off-patent brand.
The Big 3 contend that CMOPs are better at promoting generic substitution than retail outlets.
Consider the following quote from Express Scripts touting the speed at which it CMOPs moves to replace a brand name drug prescription once the brand loses its patent and a generic become available. 23 For example four-fifths of Express Scripts' mail Prozac prescriptions were converted to generic fluoxetine by September, while 63 percent were converted in retail. Similarly 80 percent of Express Scripts' mail Glucophage prescripts were converted to generic metformin by February and 53 percent in retail.
But, the situation described above only has a short-term impact on drug spending. More important financially are on going efforts to switch generics for off-patent brands.
The FTC has conducted a recent study of the possibility of business model bias on PBM behavior. As part of that study, they compared generic substitution rates by channel and corporate structure. 24 The FTC study found that the CMOPs of large independent PBMs had a But this result proves nothing about PBM management or CMOP performance for two reasons.
As we have said earlier, pharmacies do not have to be prompted by PBMs to pursue generic substitution. Retailers usually do not have to get approval from the patient or the physician before making generic substitution. MAC pricing provides plenty of incentives to make the switch.
Another reason why the FTC generic substitution test proves nothing about potential bias in the PBM business model is that brand manufacturers do not pay rebates once a drug loses its patent.
CMOPs and Retrospective Therapeutic Interchange
The main value of CMOPs stems from PBMs discretionary ability to make retrospective TI rather than any concurrent changes in orders being filled. At one time, we believed that mail order's ability to delay fulfillment for up to 48 hours after order placement was key to understanding CMOPs' role. But, recent data provided by the FTC study of PBMs indicate otherwise. The FTC received detailed data from 2 large independent PBMs indicating that concurrent TI -brand to brand and brand to generic -composed on average only .5% of all orders. 26 This figure was the virtually the same for CMOPs as for the retail networks managed by independent PBMs. The FTC was unable to obtain data on retrospective TI. Especially valuable would have been data on the proportion of retrospective TI were brand-to-brand TI versus brand-to-generic TI by PBM group. They only had listings of the paired drugs chosen for TI programs and found that the list of switches generally were cost saving even before rebates.
Because call centers work retrospectively, they rarely get involved with drugs for acute illnesses such as infections because these prescriptions never call for refills. On the other hand, prescriptions for chronic illnesses such as high cholesterol are refilled continually. Because
PBMs have little influence on demand for drugs used to treat acute illnesses, only manufacturers of brand name drugs for chronic illnesses seek to negotiate rebate contracts with PBMs.
The FTC data has helped narrow our prediction of domain of rebate payments. In another paper, we presented the case that rebates are only paid by brand name drug manufacturers in oligopolistic therapeutic classes. 27 Based on FTC data of the lack of concurrent TI, this expectation can be refined even further. Because manufacturers can only hope to influence retrospective TI, we expect that rebates are drug manufacturers pay rebates only on drug in 
CMOPs and Generic Dispensing Rates
PBMs claim that the tight integration of call center control operations with mail order operations make CMOPs a better organizational form for TI than IMOPs. As a result of this tight integration, they claim that their CMOPs produce higher generic dispensing rates. The generic dispensing rate is the ratio of the number of generic drugs dispensed divided by the number of all drugs dispensed -generics, off-patent brands, and on-patent brands. However, critics of PBMs claim that their business models are not aligned with making cost-saving, brand-to-generic TI. Critics believe that the Big 3 bias would show up in relatively low generic dispensing rates across all channels that they manage.
A study by Wosinska and Huckman found no significant differences in generic dispensing rates between the retail and the mail order channel. Until a study properly segments groups by PBM business model and looks at generic dispensing rates one channel at a time, nothing definitive can be said about the abilities of CMOPs of independent PBMs to deliver superior generic dispensing rates.
Mail Order Margins Considering Rebate Recoupment
Generally accepted accounting principles dictate that, to the extent possible, sources of revenue should be "matched" with the costs that "drive" that revenue. This matching should be done when accounting by time period and by line of business. The major weakness of the margin analysis of Medco's financials presented earlier is that it fails to fully align revenue with cost drivers. The primary reason why PBMs choose to assume the role of principal, rather than agent, in managing network providers, is to claim ownership of the transaction. This gives them the right to receive rebates and data fees. It is ownership of the transaction that distinguishes PBMs from pharmacy benefit administrators (PBAs The lower portion of Exhibit 7 above divides Medco's gross profits into two basic business drivers:
(1) retail transactions, and (2) The movement toward transparency -greater pass-through of rebates and less rebate retention -has meant that Medco has moved toward cost-based pricing for mail order and claims processing. In the past, Medco has used it competitive advantage in rebate negotiations, coupled with secrecy surrounding it rebate retention rate, to win contracts through low bids on mail order and claims processing while recouping service margin deficiencies though rebate retention. The epitome of Medco's strategy was its bid on the mail order only contract for the FEHBP, which we demonstrated earlier, was a case of predatory pricing.
As we stated earlier, there have been several credible studies of pricing differentials between retail pharmacy networks and captive mail order operations of the Big 3 PBMs. Those studies indicate that brand name drug prescriptions average 9% to 10% lower if delivered via mail than if filled by retail outlets. The analysis here suggests that Medco's mail order operations has lost about one-third of its price superiority -3 percentage points -in less than a year. If Medco hopes to maintain overall gross profit margins in the face of future rebate losses, it will surely have to increase mail order prices to the point that its price superiority would be virtually eliminated. This increase will eliminate Medco's justification for exclusionary practices in the mail order pharmacy market.
Opportunities for IMOPs
The movement toward a transparent PBM business model will provide opportunities for IMOPs to break out of their niche serving Medicaid FFS and 340B plans. The true value of CMOPs is their abilities to make cost-saving retrospective TI, and to use that potential as a bargaining chip in rebate negotiations. We have shown that it is the physician out-call unit of CMOP call centers that creates special value, not the automated dispensing pharmacies or order processing centers.
Insurance companies and Medicaid MCOs dissatisfied with the performance of their current independent PBMs do not have to make an "all or nothing" decision involving a complete "carve in" of all PBM functions requiring heavy investment in dispensing and information technology.
A less costly, but as effective, alternative would to carve in only PBM control functions like formulary design, rebate negotiations, and the physician out-call center. Claims processing and rebate data collection could be handled by a PBA like Argus or an application service provider (ASP) like Systems Xcellence. Mail order processing and dispensing and the patient in-call center could be handled by an IMOP such as drugstore.com or a regional start-up like
Wellpartner. We believe that there are no significant economies of scale in either mail order processing or dispensing beyond 30,000 prescriptions a week, or about client base totaling 700,000 lives. Certainly, it does not take the size of Medco's Las Vegas or Willingboro operations ---900,000 prescriptions dispensed per week -to reach maximum efficiency. Exhibit 9 diagrams the roles that IMOPs and PBAs could play as an alternative to contracting out all PBM functions to an independent PBM with its own CMOP.
Two large benefits consulting companies --Hewitt Associates and Towers Perrin --have team up with a number of self-insured, Fortune 500 companies to form a different structure as a way around potential PBM business model bias. 30 31 They have offered themselves to clients as a pure rebate negotiating agent without also taking control of formulary design and physician outcall centers. We have made the case here that the key to effective rebate negotiations with brand name drug manufacturers is the discretionary power to design formularies and make, or not make, retrospective TI. We predict that these plans will not effective if it leaves important PBM control functions in the hands of others. 
